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Ecotage, Ecodefense, and Deep Ecology 
! Over the past several decades, thousands of environmentally-
motivated acts of sabotage—commonly referred to as “ecosabotage” or 
“ecotage”—have caused millions of dollars in damages to individuals, 
organizations, businesses and governments involved in projects with 
controversial environmental effects Indeed, it is believed that between 1997 
and 2006 one group alone, the Earth Liberation Front, has been responsible 
for $100 million in property damage.1  Much of this destructive activity has 
taken place in the United States, where Earth Liberation Front members 
claimed responsibility for two of the most highly publicized and costly acts of 
ecotage to date: an arson at a Colorado ski resort in 1998 that destroyed 
buildings and equipment worth an estimated $12 million,2 and another in 
2003 at a California housing development, which resulted in roughly $22 
million in reconstruction costs and lost revenues.3
! As such actions have garnered public and political attention, ecotage 
has sometimes been called “eco-terrorism,” a term generally at odds with 
those employed by eco-saboteurs themselves, many of whom consider what 
they do to be some form of “civil disobedience.”4  Either label, to be sure, can 
obscure important distinctions, for while ecotage does seem to differ from 
more conventional forms of civil disobedience, primarily insofar as eco-
saboteurs tend both to act in secrecy and to be willing to destroy property, it 
also differs significantly from terrorism, since eco-saboteurs target property 
rather than people, and they do so discriminately rather than 
indiscriminately.5  Of course, precise classification of such a complex 
phenomenon is difficult.  Here, however, as with so many other contentious 
issues, it often seems that what one calls ecotage is less an expression of 
conceptual clarity about what it is, than an expression of its moral censure or 
approval.
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Perhaps not surprisingly, popular opinion has tended to favor the 
former view: ecotage has been widely condemned, even within 
environmental and activist communities.6  Yet the philosophical literature has 
sometimes suggested that ecotage may actually be morally defensible, 
particularly if the defense proceeds on consequentialist grounds.  In 
“Ecosabotage and Civil Disobedience,” for example, Michael Martin argues 
that although eco-saboteurs have not yet fully assessed the consequences of 
what they do, there is no reason to think that, if they did, they could not 
reasonably conclude that at least some acts of ecotage are morally justified.7  
Thomas Young, too, whose essay “The Morality of Ecosabotage” explicitly 
builds on Martinʼs work, proposes a form of consequentialism that he 
believes “is capable, at least in principle, of justifying some acts of strategic 
ecosabotage in a democratic society.”8
Still, philosophical consensus in this area is difficult to achieve, and 
recently Derek D. Turner has offered a perspective on the subject that 
diverges from the views of Martin and Young in several key respects.  Not 
only does Turner arrive at considerably less favorable conclusions about the 
morality of ecotage than either Martin or Young, but his commentary also 
targets non-consequentialist arguments in favor of it, focusing specifically on 
versions of such arguments that are rooted in the philosophy of deep 
ecology.9  This latter aspect of Turnerʼs work is quite welcome, especially in 
light of the historical affiliation between deep ecology supporters and Earth 
First!, an activist organization well-known for having eco-saboteurs among its 
members.  But it also indicates the need for an expanded analysis of the 
connection between ecotage and the philosophical views of deep ecologists, 
an analysis that, once completed, may lead to conclusions different from 
those that Turner himself has drawn.
My aim in this essay, therefore, is to take Turnerʼs reflections on this 
issue as an opportunity to re-examine the relationship between deep 
ecological philosophy and eco-sabotage.  Concentrating on the texts of Arne 
Naess, I will attempt to show that there are two relatively distinct non-
consequentialist lines of justification of ecotage that can be derived from his 
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8 Young 2001, 385.
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writings, and that these are connected to two relatively distinct notions of 
“identification” that can be found therein.  After discussing the first of these 
justifications, and Turnerʼs critique of it, I will detail the second, and argue 
that it is potentially less problematic than Turnerʼs commentary might be 
taken to suggest.  All of this will lead to the conclusion that more work would 
need to be done to be able to claim definitively that deep ecological 
saboteurs are in the wrong.  This examination will start, though, with a point 
of conceptual clarification about Naessʼs eco-philosophy, one that will then 
serve as the basis for our ensuing discussion.
 Belonging and Kinship
! As we begin, it is important to keep in mind that the term “deep 
ecology” does not signify a single, unified philosophical position.  Rather, it is 
meant to refer to a broad-based environmental movement whose members 
share certain beliefs and objectives without necessarily agreeing on their 
deeper philosophical or religious underpinnings.10  Nevertheless, many who 
have articulated the underlying reasons for their support of the deep ecology 
movement have followed the line of thought laid out by Arne Naess, who 
emphasizes the relevance of conceptions of the self for environmental ethics, 
and issues an associated call for human “identification” with nature.  As I 
have argued elsewhere, though, the notion of identification has more than 
one meaning for Naess, and this is important to recognize when seeking to 
evaluate the conceptual strengths or weaknesses of his position.  In what 
immediately follows, therefore, I will be describing two senses of identification 
that appear in Naessʼs writings before returning to the discussion of ecotage 
in the next section.
! In many places Naess argues that, traditionally, we in the West have 
not looked upon ourselves as part and parcel of the natural world, or viewed 
ourselves as members of ecological communities.  Instead, we have taken 
ourselves to be either isolated individuals or, at most, members of human 
social groups.11  Accordingly, Naess claims that we have become largely 
“alienated”12 from nature: we regard ourselves as separate, discrete entities 
with no essential relatedness to ecological realities, as beings fundamentally 
disconnected from the world outside ourselves.  Hence, in part because this 
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outlook is thought to be metaphysically false, and in part because it is 
believed to have highly undesirable ethical implications, Naess urges us to 
replace it with one that is appropriately ecologically-expanded.  He urges us, 
that is, to develop our narrow sense of “self” into a far more inclusive 
ecological “Self.”13
As Naess explains it, the development of oneʼs ecological Self occurs 
through a process of “identification” with nature, and in the context just 
specified, it is not too difficult to see just what this process entails.  In his 
words, identification involves “understanding and appreciating [oneʼs] 
relations with all other life forms and to the Earth as a whole”;14 it is a process 
whereby one comes to see that “everything is interconnected”15 or, as he put 
it in one of his earliest formulations, that all living things, including oneself, 
are “knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations.”16  What such 
passages are describing, of course, is the cultivation of a sense of oneʼs 
embeddedness in, or belonging to, the encompassing natural environment, 
and for this reason I have referred to this particular sense of identification as 
“identification-as-belonging.”  Through identification of this sort, one expands 
oneʼs sense of self to include the natural world, ultimately becoming aware of 
oneself as intimately connected to nature, and aware of nature as an intimate 
part of oneself.
! This characterization of identification is no doubt familiar to those 
acquainted with the writings of theorists in the deep ecology movement, as it 
is surely one of the most commonly expressed ideas therein.  Moreover, it is 
also the conception of identification with which commentators have most 
frequently taken up.  But there is another sense of identification to be found 
in Naessʼs texts, one that he himself does not typically distinguish from 
identification-as-belonging but which is no less important to his philosophical 
system, and no less important to the discussion of ecotage to which we will 
soon turn.
! In the essay “Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the 
World,” Naess recounts what he calls a “paradigm situation” of 
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14 Naess 1989, 166.
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identification.17  One day while working in a laboratory, he witnessed the 
death of a flea that had jumped into some chemicals he was observing on a 
microscope slide.  Watching the fleaʼs struggle, he recalls, evoked in him a 
strong sense of compassion.  But he believes that more basic than such 
compassion, and actually what made it possible, was his identification with 
the tiny animal, the fact that, as he says, “I saw myself in the flea.”  
Elaborating upon this statement, he writes, “If I had been alienated from the 
flea, not seeing intuitively anything even resembling myself, the death 
struggle would have left me feeling indifferent.”18  A similar account of 
identification is given in Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, where Naess 
describes a scenario in which an adult comes upon some children killing 
insects with bug spray, and poses to them the question, “perhaps those 
animals might, like you, prefer to live rather than to die?”  Such a question 
could, Naess says, encourage the children to identify with the insects, to “see 
and experience spontaneously and immediately the insects as themselves, 
not only as something different but in an important sense like themselves.”19  
! What is notable about these examples is that, in both cases, 
identification is portrayed not as a matter of recognizing connectedness to 
other-than-human beings, but as a matter of recognizing commonality with 
them.  That is, they both portray identification as something that is less about 
seeing such others as a part of oneself than about recognizing that they are 
somehow similar to oneself, or “like” oneself in some way.  This same 
understanding of identification is conveyed in Naessʼs most recent text Lifeʼs 
Philosophy, where he says that experiences of identification are experiences 
in which “we recognize something of ourselves in the other creature, or 
something of the other creature in ourselves.”20  What distinguishes this type 
of identification, then, is the stress it places on acknowledging continuity or 
likeness, and thus I have called it “identification-as-kinship”: it is a form of 
identification that involves becoming aware of the basic similarities that 
obtain between oneself and others, the ways in which other-than-human 
beings are essentially akin to oneself.
! Now although these two types of identification are undoubtedly 
compatible, there are at least two differences between them that are 
important to note.  The first is that each addresses a different problem and, 
consequently, presents a different solution to it, something that can be seen 
when we observe that even though both types of identification aim at 
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20 Naess 2002, 114.
overcoming “alienation” from nature, such alienation can itself be conceived 
in more than one way.  On the one hand, alienation can refer to a sense of 
separation from nature, a failure to understand or appreciate the full extent of 
oneʼs interconnectedness with the natural world.  As a response to this 
particular failure, identification shows itself to be a way of healing the human/
nature divide, a means of re-establishing oneʼs connectedness to nature by 
re-drawing the boundaries of oneʼs self to include it.  On the other hand, as 
Naessʼs example of the children killing insects illustrates, alienation can be 
associated with what might be called careless attitudes towards other-than-
human entities, an insensitive disregard that mistakenly sees them as 
completely “alien” or unlike oneself.  Taken as a response to this sort of 
alienation, therefore, identification emerges as an affirmation of what self and 
others have in common, something that counters the mundane indifference 
with which one views other-than-human beings by providing an intimation of 
the various respects in which they are like oneself.  
! The second of the differences mentioned above is more axiological 
than metaphysical, and has to do with the fact that although each type of 
identification is said to function as what Naess calls “a source of belief in 
intrinsic values,”21 the way in which each does so is unique.  Through the 
process of identification-as-belonging, natureʼs value comes to be thought of 
as essentially identical to oneʼs own, since on this model nature comes to be 
thought of as a part of oneself.  Hence, insofar as one believes oneself to 
have value independently of oneʼs usefulness to others, or intrinsic value, this 
form of identification leads one to see nature as having such value as well.  
A similarly non-instrumentalist value-orientation also issues from 
identification-as-kinship, yet here, rather than stemming from the expansion 
of an intrinsically valuable self, such an orientation stems from an expanded 
awareness of other-than-human others, an awareness that allows one to see 
that they, too, have a value irreducible to their utility.  That is, through this 
type of identification one becomes aware of other-than-human beings as 
entities of the same sort as oneself, and thus one is led to ascribe to them 
value of the same sort as that which is ascribed to oneself.  As Naess 
expresses it, this type of identification leads to the conclusion that “if I have a 
right to live, you have the same right.”22  
The “Ecodefense” Argument
!
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! The preceding remarks, while admittedly somewhat abbreviated, 
suffice to establish the conceptual background for our discussion of 
specifically “deep ecological” arguments pertaining to eco-sabotage.  Having 
arrived at this point, let us proceed by looking at the relationship between 
deep ecology and ecotage as characterized by Turner, and at the objections 
he raises to justifications of environmental sabotage that draw on the 
philosophical principles just outlined.
! In his analysis, Turner focuses on what he refers to as the 
“ecodefense” argument for ecotage.23  This argument, he rightly points out, is 
one in which eco-saboteurs try to defend what they do by appeal not to the 
possible outcomes of their actions, but to a “higher law” that they believe 
justifies ecotage as a matter of principle.  Of course, the idea that one moral 
law or principle is “higher” than another can be understood in several ways.  
As Turner explains, though, in this case calling a moral principle “higher” 
simply means that it can have priority over others, that it is, as Turner says, 
“more basic” and, as such, “trumps” or takes precedence over other 
principles if and when it comes into conflict with them.24
! In its particulars, the ecodefense argument is a variant of the position 
that asserts that while it is usually wrong to damage or destroy another 
personʼs private property, it is also usually permissible to defend oneself 
against undue harm or violation, and if such self-defense ever were to require 
breaking the prohibition against property destruction, self-defense would take 
priority and the property destruction would be morally justified.  Clearly, in this 
line of reasoning, the higher moral principle is the principle of self-defense, 
which is given precedence over respect for other peopleʼs property in conflict 
cases.  In the above formulation, however, the argument is not yet an 
argument for “eco-” defense.  Where it takes on its expressly ecological cast 
is the point at which one introduces the notion of an ecological Self into the 
principle of self-defense, which effectively extends the range of actions that 
fall under that principle to include actions done in defense of nature.  The 
thinking here, in other words, is that if nature is an extended part of oneself, 
then to protect it is to protect oneʼs Self, and thus property destruction on 
natureʼs behalf is as permissible as property destruction on behalf of oneself.  
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In short, if one has identified with nature, then ecotage is every bit as 
justifiable as self-defense, because it is Self-defense.25
It is worth mentioning that the basic structure of this argument is 
consonant with the views of Naess and other deep ecology theorists, many of 
whom state explicitly that when one identifies with nature and develops oneʼs 
ecological Self, the defense of the natural world becomes a matter of Self-
defense.26  This is, furthermore, an argument that some of the most vocal 
advocates of ecotage have actually expressed.  To cite just one example, in 
Confessions of an Eco-Warrior Earth First! founder Dave Foreman provides a 
number of possible justifications of the actions of eco-saboteurs, among 
which is included the idea that “[w]hen we fully identify with a wild place,” 
ecotage “…becomes self-defense, which is a fundamental right.”27  
Such conviction notwithstanding, Turner voices several concerns 
about this pattern of argument, among which is the worry that construing the 
self, and consequently the principle of self-defense, so broadly appears to 
justify any property destruction whatsoever done on behalf of the 
environment.  Since identification can be with any element of the natural 
world, it seems that any and all transformative uses of nature—even those 
that are sustainable, or that have minimal environmental impact—can be 
taken as transgressions against the Self and, as such, warrant property 
damage.  Because of this, Turner says that it is “impossible for anyone who 
takes property rights at all seriously to endorse the expanded law of self-
defence….”28  In addition, Turner finds that higher law arguments face the 
general difficulty of explaining why one moral principle should be given 
priority over another, and he says that eco-saboteurs have not solved this 
difficulty.29  He believes, however, that even if they were to work out this 
problem of principle-ranking, it is highly implausible that they could justify 
prioritizing a moral principle like the expanded law of Self-defense, which is 
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premised on so controversial an idea as the ecological Self.30  And it appears 
that at least part of the reason why he finds this idea to be so controversial is 
that he thinks it results less from rational deliberation than from some sort of 
ecological consciousness, that it is an outlook whose adoption is “more like a 
religious conversion than a decision based on careful consideration of 
reasons and evidence.”31
Surveying these comments, it seems fair to say that at the core of 
Turnerʼs critique of the ecodefense argument is an objection to the notion of 
the ecological Self upon which the argument ultimately rests.  For although it 
is accurate to claim that prioritizing moral principles can be philosophically 
tricky, it is also the case that there are some situations in which doing so is 
typically regarded as relatively uncontroversial.  This is especially true when 
the principle in question is self-defense, which is quite frequently thought to 
be so basic that it can outweigh even the prohibition against killing.32  Self-
defense is, moreover, a principle that many people are inclined to rank higher 
than respect for property, particularly if the property in question comprises 
part of the threat to oneself, and if by damaging that property one is able to 
defend oneself without directly harming others.  But still, even if these points 
were conceded, the issue pertaining to the notion of the ecological Self that 
Turner raises would remain, which is that thinkers like Naess widen the 
conception of the self so significantly, and articulate its details so vaguely, 
that it makes it difficult, if not impossible, to say that Self-defense could be 
given the same priority as its more narrow counterpart.  Any “trump” power 
that may have been assigned to the principle of self-defense, it seems, is 
thrown into question when the entity to which that principle refers is the entity 
described by deep ecology theorists, when the “self” defended is the greatly 
modified, environmentally-expanded ecological Self.  
Without doubt, there is much in this critique to which deep ecology 
theorists might want to respond.  For our purposes, though, what is most 
crucial to recognize is that the sort of identification at issue in it is 
identification-as-belonging.  Since it is identification-as-belonging that issues 
in an expanded sense of Self, it should be evident that it is this sort of 
identification that underlies the expanded principle of Self-defense and, 
accordingly, the ecodefense argument.  Of course, acknowledging this point 
does not resolve the problems we have been discussing.  It takes on special 
significance, however, in light of the somewhat surprising fact that Naess 
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himself doubts that eco-saboteurs could always appeal to this sort of 
identification to justify what they do, or legitimately claim that their efforts to 
defend nature amount to Self-defense.
Not long after the publication of Ecodefense, the well-known guide to 
ecotage co-edited by Foreman, Naess wrote to Foreman outlining some of 
his thoughts about the book.  In the letter, Naess cites the case of a Sami 
man who tried to blow up a bridge to prevent a development project that was 
encroaching upon his homeland.  Clearly conveying his confidence that the 
man was acting on the basis of a deep sense of belonging to, and identity 
with, his local environment, Naess says that the man “defended a place 
where he belonged.  He said it was part of himself.”33  Shortly after making 
these comments, though, Naess adds that many eco-saboteurs in the United 
States live so far removed from natural areas that it is unlikely that they have 
developed such an intimate attachment to them.  This circumstance, he 
claims, “makes the above-mentioned justification of non-violence or even 
violence not directly applicable.”34
Although these remarks are brief, they are sufficient to demonstrate 
that while Naess does not disagree with the ecodefense argument in 
principle, he also feels that not all eco-saboteurs can make honest use of it.  
In the United States, at least, it seems that there would be many acts of 
ecotage that Naess would say simply could not be justified by an appeal to 
Self-defense.  Yet, despite what he sees as their potential lack of 
identification with the landscape, Naess does not oppose everything that 
American eco-saboteurs do.  Quite the contrary, in his correspondence with 
Foreman he says that tree-spiking is an “obviously justifiable” tactic to protect 
forests, and that the “Animal Defense” chapter of Ecodefense—which 
explains, among other things, how to destroy traps used to snare animals—is 
“very convincing.”35  “Sabotage to fight the abominable practice in trapping,” 
Naess asserts unambiguously, “is clearly justifiable….”36
Statements like these are important insofar as they show quite 
unmistakably that Naess admits arguments for eco-sabotage other than that 
which we have been considering, routes to the justification of ecotage other 
than that which leads through identification-as-belonging.  Unfortunately, in 
his remarks to Foreman he provides little detail about what these alternate 
routes might be.  Our initial analysis of Naessʼs eco-philosophy, however, 
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surely suggests one such alternative: that which relies not on identification-
as-belonging but, instead, on identification-as-kinship.  Following Naessʼs 
lead, then, let us shift focus to consider how this other type of identification 
might function to justify ecotage, and whether or not such a justification would 
be vulnerable to the same sorts of criticisms that Turner levels against the 
ecodefense argument.
 The “Other Defense” Argument
! In order to understand how identification-as-kinship could serve to 
sanction ecotage, we need first to recall the distinctive axiological orientation 
it entails.  As we have seen, the basic difference between identification-as-
belonging and identification-as-kinship is that the former involves developing 
a sense of connectedness to nature while the latter involves recognizing 
commonalities with other-than-human entities.  Thus, unlike identification-as-
belonging, which finds value in nature insofar as it comes to be seen as an 
extension of an intrinsically valuable Self, identification-as-kinship expands 
oneʼs awareness of other-than-human others such that they, like oneself, are 
seen to be intrinsically valuable.  This last point could be encapsulated by 
saying that identification-as-kinship leads to a distinctively “other-regarding” 
value-orientation, and this value-orientation leads, rather straightforwardly, to 
a distinct rationale for the protection of nature.  No longer a question of 
protecting nature as oneʼs Self, the defense of nature that flows from 
identification-as-kinship amounts to seeking the protection of others with a 
moral significance comparable to oneʼs own, trying to ensure that other-than-
human entities receive the moral consideration this form of identification 
allows one to see that they, too, are due.
! If, therefore, there is a “higher law” argument in favor of ecotage to be 
derived from identification-as-kinship, it would not be premised on the moral 
permissibility of Self-defense.  It would be premised, instead, on the moral 
permissibility of the defense of others.  More specifically, it would seem to 
build on the idea that one ought to protect morally significant others from 
undue harm or violation, and that if such protection ever were to require 
breaking the prohibition against property destruction, doing so would be 
allowable.  What identification-as-kinship adds to this, of course, is an 
expanded sense of just who counts as “morally significant,” an elevated 
appreciation of the moral worth of other-than-human entities.  The resulting 
argument would be that just as the protection of human beings sometimes 
warrants breaking the prohibition against property destruction, so too does 
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the protection of beings who are other-than-human.  Simply put, if sabotage 
on behalf of other morally valuable humans is justifiable, then so is ecotage.
! To be sure, this more other-oriented argument for ecotage is, like the 
argument from Self-defense, not merely hypothetical.  Rik Scarce appeals to 
it in Eco-Warriors,37 as does Christopher Manes in Green Rage.38  In some 
instances, even, its connection to identification-as-kinship shows through, as 
in the aforementioned “Animal Defense” chapter of Ecodefense.  This 
chapter opens with a stark account of what Coyotes go through when caught 
in leg-hold traps, a harsh portrait of the intense pain and suffering they are 
typically forced to endure, and their sometimes drastic, most often futile 
efforts to escape.39  Surely this is aimed at eliciting from readers identification 
with the Coyotes of the same kind that Naess experienced with the flea, 
along with a similarly empathetic reaction to their plight.  And it seems clear 
that this is done in the hope that such identification will convince readers that, 
as Naess put it in his letter to Foreman, the sort of trapping discussed in 
Ecodefense is “abominable,” and that trap-line sabotage is “clearly 
justifiable.”40
! Very much to his credit, this particular defense of ecotage is also 
acknowledged by Turner, who mentions more than once that deep ecological 
eco-saboteurs could try to justify their actions by an appeal to a heightened 
sense of the moral significance of other-than-human entities.41  Regrettably, 
though, in his critical analysis he does not address this alternative line of 
justification separately from the ecodefense argument.  We would do well to 
ask, therefore, if comments of the sort that Turner directs at the latter carry 
the same force when applied to the former, if the critical scrutiny applied to 
the ecodefense argument can be withstood by this other pattern of 
reasoning. 
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to Manes holds that “radical environmentalism attempts to claim a more elevated station for 
ecotage as part of the liberal tradition of the defense of minority rights, with the complication 
that the minority in this case is the unprotected animal and plant communities being 
destroyed” (1990, 176).
39 Foreman and Haywood 1993, 158-61.
40 Naess 1999, 228.
41 Turner 2006, 222, 223, 224.
! We might start to reply to this question by observing that what many 
people would find most controversial about the argument under consideration 
is the scope of the moral community includes, and not the principle-ranking it 
involves.  While one certainly could dispute the claim that other-defense 
ought to be given precedence over other moral obligations, it is also certain 
that there are situations in which it is commonly deemed acceptable to do so.  
Additionally, as eco-saboteurs would be quick to point out, one of the 
obligations over which such defense is likely to be given priority is the 
obligation to respect other peopleʼs property, especially in cases where the 
property in question constitutes part of the threat to others, and damaging 
that property allows one to defend them without directly harming their 
aggressors.42  If this is correct, though, then the real point of controversy here 
is not the priority assigned to the defense of others; it is, rather, the 
contention that others who are other-than-human are worthy of it.
! What these initial remarks indicate, then, is that what is most 
problematic about this argument is not necessarily its appeal to higher law, 
but its claim about the moral significance of other-than-human entities, and 
after examining Turnerʼs commentary, we might think that this claim is 
hopelessly problematic when based on identification-as-kinship.  The reason 
for this is that this form of identification, like identification-as-belonging, is not 
so much a product of logical analysis as of lived experience, experience that 
Naess routinely portrays as more spontaneous and feeling than thoughtful 
and deliberative.  In his words, identification is a “spontaneous, non-rational” 
process;43 it is something that happens “completely spontaneously, without 
thinking at all,” “without a trace of deliberation.”44  As Turnerʼs work highlights, 
however, the trouble with this is that it implies that beliefs about other-than-
human beings that are grounded in instances of identification are 
disconnected from rational discussion or critique.  It implies, that is, that 
those who identify with nature in this way undergo a kind of “gestalt-shift” or 
change in their perception of other-than-human beings that is, to borrow 
Turnerʼs analogy, similar to a religious “conversion” experience, something 
that is largely felt or intuited rather than being “based on careful consideration 
of reasons and evidence.”45  But if belief in the moral significance of other-
than human others is in fact the result of such experience, then not only will 
this argument for ecotage be entirely unconvincing to those who have not 
gone through the process of identification, but it becomes increasingly 
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difficult to see why anyone would allow the defense of other-than human 
beings to trump such a rationally agreeable principle as the principle of 
respect for property.
! Obviously these are substantive points, and they touch on issues in 
the psychology and philosophy of human experience that go well beyond the 
scope of this essay.  It should be noted, though, that the fact that 
identification-as-kinship is more experiential than deliberative does not mean 
that it is wholly uninfluenced by deliberation or thoughtful reflection.  Indeed, 
in Respect for Nature Paul Taylor describes how scientistsʼ careful study and 
observation of other living things can contribute directly to their deepening 
identification with them.46  Similarly, in Animal Rights and Human Morality 
Bernard Rollin tells the story of a scientist who said that the more he studied 
micro-organisms “the more he understood their telos and their life, the more 
he could empathize with them, and the more loath he was to destroy them.”47  
Accounts such as these indicate that reflection and deliberation play 
important roles in shaping experiences of identification, serving not only to 
encourage or inhibit them, but also to influence their scope and intensity.  
This being the case, it seems that identification should not be regarded as a 
completely discrete phenomenon, one that occurs entirely separately from 
other, more reflective dimensions of human life.
! Moreover, even if actual instances of identification do not themselves 
entail logical analysis, this in no way forces the conclusion that the insights 
gained from these instances cannot be articulated coherently to others, and 
in a manner that at least some people would find rationally compelling.  
Consider, for example, the story told by Rollin of the time that he was fishing, 
and “for no obvious reason” suddenly realized that the fish he was catching 
were struggling against him not because of the thrill of competition, but out of 
panic and fear.48  This experience, which Rollin himself describes as a 
“gestalt shift” in his relationship to fish,49 was clearly spontaneous in 
character, but it is also one whose lesson about other-than-human beings is 
easily communicable to, and graspable by, others.  Perhaps even more 
pertinent to the present discussion, however, is that such an experience of 
identification can be reflectively analyzed into certain component elements 
and expressed in more formal-logical terms as part of an argument for the 
moral significance of other-than-human entities, something to which Rollinʼs 
own work surely testifies.
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Of course, it is possible that people who have not identified with other-
than-human beings in this way would not find such an argument all that 
convincing.  As the above examples illustrate, lived experience does seem to 
establish a context within which we make sense, or non-sense, of various 
moral claims, and thus experiences of identification-as-kinship would appear 
to provide a crucial background that illuminates or lends intelligibility to claims 
about the intrinsic value of other-than-human entities.50  Given this, those 
who have not identified with such others, or who have not identified with them 
very deeply, may very well find arguments about their moral significance to 
be fantastic.  But considering everything that we have said so far, it is not at 
all obvious that this type of identification is not a valid source of moral insight, 
or that the ethical context it helps to create is entirely illegitimate.  Actually, it 
is arguable that experiences of identification-as-kinship are as important to 
inter-human ethics as Naess proposes that they are to environmental ethics.  
Yet if this is accurate, then unless we are prepared to discredit the 
experiential and affective dimensions of moral life in general, we cannot 
discredit beliefs about the intrinsic value of other-than-human beings solely 
because they are connected to experiences of identification-as-kinship, nor 
can we immediately resolve disagreements about the moral significance of 
these beings in favor of those who have not identified with them.  In fact, 
deep ecology theorists like Naess could hold nearly the opposite, and claim 
that just as the moral attitudes of those who do not identify with other human 
beings are limited or deficient in some ways, so are the moral attitudes of 
those who do not identify with beings other-than-human.
The upshot of these reflections, then, is that the experiential character 
of identification-as-kinship, and the potentially controversial nature of the 
moral attitudes that may flow from it, are not in themselves reason enough to 
dismiss the particular value-orientation that we have been discussing.  And 
this means, furthermore, that it is more difficult than it may at first have 
appeared to dismiss the defense of ecotage that rests upon it.  If the claim 
that other-than-human entities are intrinsically valuable is not completely 
groundless when it is rooted in experiences of identification-as-kinship, then 
the other-defending argument for ecotage that deep ecology supporters like 
Naess might offer cannot be rejected out-of-hand simply because, in making 
that claim, it implicitly or explicitly appeals to such experiences.  Needless to 
say, this is a fairly limited conclusion, and it does not settle the question of 
the morality of ecotage once and for all in favor of eco-saboteurs.  But it does 
allow us to see that the matter is not yet settled decidedly against them, 
either.  We may not yet be able to say that eco-saboteurs who proceed on 
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and Human Morality (1992, 79-82).
this basis are absolutely in the right, but from what we have just seen, it 
would be too hasty to conclude that they are definitely in the wrong.
 Concluding Remarks
As we bring our discussion to a close, we should clarify that by shifting 
focus away from the ecodefense argument and the principle of Self-defense, 
we have not meant to imply that nothing more can be said about that 
particular justification of ecotage or the concepts in Naessʼs eco-philosophy 
upon which it draws.  Rather, our goals have been, first, to show that there is 
more than one non-consequentialist justification of ecotage that can be 
derived from Naessʼs work, and second, to follow up on his remarks to the 
effect that Self-defense may not be the most promising, or genuine, 
argument that deep ecological eco-saboteurs could offer on their own behalf.  
In doing this, what we have found is that the justification of ecotage that is 
linked to identification-as-kinship is, at the very least, stronger than Turnerʼs 
critique of the ecodefense argument could be taken to suggest that it is, and 
that therefore it is yet to be established that other-defending acts of ecotage 
are morally impermissible.
To say that some acts of ecotage may be justifiable in principle, 
however, is not the equivalent of saying that they are easily justified in 
practice.  As a number of other thinkers have pointed out, many if not all of 
the actions that would count as eco-sabotage bear a high burden of 
justification, and if they are acceptable at all, it could only be in situations 
where legal means of protecting nature have failed or are sure to do so, and 
where the same is true of more conventional forms of civil disobedience.51  
Even in such situations, of course, important questions would remain to be 
answered, including questions about what constitutes unethical treatment of 
other-than-human beings, what are the circumstances in which their defense 
might warrant sabotage, and what forms of sabotage could be legitimate to 
employ on their behalf.  In the end, though, it may be that in his remarks to 
Foreman about Ecodefense Naess was correct, and that in some instances 
deep ecological activists will indeed be able to find “a justification for using 
various mild forms of sabotage….”52
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